

DCI/IC-75-3940  
3 November 1975


MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the Action Plan Task Group

SUBJECT : "Issues and Answers" Paper on Role and  
Functions of Senior U.S. Foreign  
Intelligence Officer

1. Reference is our meeting of 31 October, at which it was reported Mr. Colby's comments had been received on the initial draft of the paper cited in the subject above.

2. The paper has been redrafted to respond to Mr. Colby's comments.

3. Consideration of this paper will be an agenda item at our meeting at 1500 hours, Tuesday, 4 November. I am particularly interested in whether you identify any additional elements and alternatives of significance for addition to the tabulation.

  
Samuel V. Wilson  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Chairman, Action Plan Task Group

Attachment:  
as stated

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# ISSUES AND ANSWERS: ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE SENIOR U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

## ISSUE

1. What should be the role and position of the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer? What key organizational factors and management or other responsibilities will make this officer most effective?

## POSITION OF SELECT COMMITTEES

2. The Senate and House Select Committees have not yet held hearings which relate to this paper. Individual staff members of both committees appear to favor a stronger role for the DCI, especially in fiscal matters.

## DISCUSSION

3. Analyses approaching book-length have been written on various aspects of the problem posed by this issue. The approach taken in this paper is to omit detailed analysis or debate on the pros and cons of various alternatives. Instead, focus is put on the identification of the basic elements of the problem and feasible alternatives within each element.

4. The result has been development of the attached tabulation organized as follows:

<u>Element</u>	<u>No. Alternatives</u>	<u>Type Identifier</u>
Position in Executive Branch Hierarchy	4	I-IV
Relation to National Security Council	6	A-F
Operational Responsibilities	4	1-4
Fiscal Responsibilities	4	a-d
Responsibilities for Guidance re Information Requirements	6	(1)-(6)
Responsibilities for Production of National Intelligence	4	(a)-(d)
Responsibilities re Covert Action	5	1.-5.
Inspector General Role	3	a.-c.
Relations with the Congress	3	1/-3/
Relation to the USIB and IRAC	5	a/-e/

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5. From the tabulation, many thousands of possible combinations of roles and functions can be identified, each differing from the other in at least one of the alternatives listed.

#### RECOMMENDATION

6. It is recognized that agreement on a set of alternatives which the DCI should support will require considerable study and discussion, both within the Executive Branch and, as appropriate, with Committees of the Congress. As basis for such study and discussion, it is recommended that the DCI approve the concept of a senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer identified from the attached tabulation by the following symbols:

III B 2 a (3) (b) 3. c. 1./ a./

7. This formula translates into the following description of the proposed role and functions of the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer:

III. Director of Central Intelligence (or other appropriate title) who serves as operational head of the central intelligence organization and as the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer, but is not a member of internal White House Staff organization.

(This would be a continuation of the present position of the DCI, but with enhanced responsibilities, as indicated below.)

- B. Intelligence Advisor to the NSC and chairman of the NSC Intelligence Committee.
- 2. Serves as the operating head of the CIA, and as the Executive Agent of the Government for the overall management and direction of the NSA and the NRO.
- a. Develops, reviews and approves budgets for the CIA, NSA and NRO and prepares recommendations concerning the budgets of other Intelligence Community organizations. Is responsible for maximum national-departmental interaction in development of his fiscal program. Submits the overall intelligence budget to the President, through OMB. Defends before Congress the President's budget for the Intelligence Community.

(This would remove approval of the NSA and NRO budgets from the Defense Department.)

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(3) Develops and issues guidance concerning information requirements for national intelligence; reviews the adequacy with which collection requirements developed by all elements of the Community reflect his guidance, and makes recommendations as to necessary improvements.

(b) Is responsible to the President for approving all national intelligence products and for the evaluation of the quality and responsiveness of such products to national needs, but shares the actual production responsibilities with other agencies.

(This assumes the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer is also the operating head of the CIA, which retains its present production responsibilities.)

3. Serves as a member of the 40 Committee (or its equivalent), participates in the review of covert action proposals, and is responsible for the conduct of covert actions as the Director of the CIA.

c. Has no Community-wide Inspector General role.

1./ Is the chief spokesman before Congress for the Intelligence Community, including defense of the President's budget for intelligence activities and for provision of national intelligence products to the Congress in a manner worked out with the Congress and its Committees.

a./ Serves as chairman of both the USIB and the IRAC, with these bodies continuing to have their present responsibilities.

(This assumes the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer is responsible both for national intelligence products and for preparation of the NFIP.)

#### PROPOSED ACTION

8. It is recommended that the role and functions of the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer as outlined in paragraphs 6 and 7 above be used as the basis for:

- a. Discussions within the White House on the Administration position with respect to forthcoming legislation and/or Executive Orders;
- b. Presentations by Executive Branch officials to the Senate and House Select Committees;
- c. Public statements by influential friends and supporters of a strong U.S. foreign intelligence program;
- d. Private discussion, as appropriate, with Senators and Congressmen who are interested in preserving a strong U.S. foreign intelligence capability.

Samuel V. Wilson  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Chairman, Action Plan Task Group

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TABULATION OF BASIC ELEMENTS AND RELATED ALTERNATIVES  
WHICH DEFINE POSSIBLE FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES  
OF THE SENIOR U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Position in Executive Branch Hierarchy

- I. Special Assistant to the President (or other appropriate title) on the White House Staff
- II. Secretary of a Department of National Intelligence with Cabinet status
- III. Director of Central Intelligence (or other appropriate title) who serves as operating head of the central intelligence organization and as senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer, but is not a member of the internal White House Staff organization. (This would be a continuation of the present position of the DCI.)
- IV. The concept of a senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer is abandoned. (The DCI, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense would each serve as intelligence advisors to the President within their present spheres of operational responsibility.)

Relation to the National Security Council

- A. Full member of the NSC and chairman of the NSC Intelligence Committee.
- B. Intelligence Advisor to the NSC and chairman of the NSC Intelligence Committee.
- C. Advisor to the NSC and member of the NSCIC and other NSC committees/groups. (The current role of the DCI.)
- D. Advisor to the NSC, but not a member of the NSCIC.
- E. Member of the NSCIC, but not a participant in NSC sessions.
- F. No direct contact with the NSC or its committees/groups.

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Operational Responsibilities

1. Serves as the Executive Agent of the Government for the overall management and direction of all major national intelligence collection programs--but not as the operating head of any of them. (The Secretary of Defense would no longer be Executive Agent for the NSA and NRO programs. The Senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer would not be the operating director of CIA.)
2. Serves as the operating head of the CIA, and as the Executive Agent of the Government for the overall management and direction of the NSA and the NRO.
3. Serves as the operating head of the CIA, but has no Executive Agent or other operational responsibilities for any other national program.
4. None. (The senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer would have no operating or Executive Agent responsibilities, and the Director of the CIA would be a separate official.)

Fiscal Responsibilities

- a. Develops, reviews and approves budgets for the CIA, NSA and NRO and prepares recommendations concerning the budgets of other Intelligence Community organizations. (This would remove approval of the NSA and NRO budgets from the Defense Department.) Is responsible for maximum national-departmental interaction in development of his fiscal program. Submits the overall intelligence budget to the President through OMB. Defends before Congress the President's budget for the Intelligence Community.
- b. Reviews and approves budgets for all elements of the national intelligence program. (This would leave development of program budgets as a departmental or agency responsibility as at present--the new factor being that approval by the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer would be required.) Submits the overall intelligence budget to the President, through OMB. Defends before Congress the President's budget for the Intelligence Community.
- c. Reviews and forwards to the President, through OMB, his recommendations concerning the overall national foreign intelligence program for those elements of the program for which he does not have operating responsibility, and is responsible for maximum national-departmental interaction in development of the program recommendations. (This would be a continuation of the present DCI role as regards the NFIP, since he now approves the CIA budget and makes recommendations concerning other elements of the NFIP.)

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Departmental proposals would not require approval of the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer.

d. None. (The concept of an NFIP would be abandoned.)

Responsibilities Concerning Requirements for Intelligence Information

(1) Develops, approves and issues all requirements for the collection of national intelligence information for all major collection systems--SIGINT, imagery and human source.

(2) Develops and issues guidance concerning information requirements for national intelligence.

(3) Develops and issues guidance concerning information requirements for national intelligence; reviews the adequacy with which collection requirements developed by all elements of the Community reflect his guidance, and makes recommendations as to necessary improvements.

(4) Conducts a continuing detailed review of specific intelligence collection requirements as developed by various elements of the Community, assesses completeness of the requirements lists with respect to national intelligence needs, and submits recommendations for additions or deletions to the managers of collection activities.

(5) Reviews and evaluates the effectiveness and adequacy of the procedures used within various elements of the Intelligence Community for the development and approval of collection requirements.

(6) None.

Responsibilities for Production of National Intelligence

(a) Has sole responsibility for the production of national intelligence and is the operating head of the production organization.

(b) Is responsible to the President for approving all national intelligence products, and for the evaluation of the quality and responsiveness of such products to national needs, but shares the actual production responsibilities with other agencies. (This assumes the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer is also the operating head of the CIA, which retains its present production responsibilities.)

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(c) Has no production responsibilities, but is responsible for providing guidance to the Intelligence Community as to intelligence needs and priorities, and for the review and evaluation of the resulting national intelligence products.

(d) None.

#### Responsibilities for Covert Action

1. Heads the 40 Committee (or its equivalent) and develops recommendations for Presidential approval/disapproval of covert action proposals, but has no operational role in direction of covert actions.

2. Serves as a member of the 40 Committee (or its equivalent) and participates in review of covert action proposals, but has no role in directing conduct of covert actions.

3. Serves as a member of the 40 Committee (or its equivalent), participates in the review of covert action proposals, and is responsible for the conduct of covert actions as the Director of the CIA.

4. Serves as a member of the 40 Committee (or its equivalent), participates in the review of covert action proposals, and is the operating head of a special covert action organization separated from the CIA.

5. None.

#### Inspector General Role

a. Supported by his own IG Staff, is responsible for the conduct of such investigations as he considers appropriate, including those which will assure all organizations involved in foreign intelligence are complying with legislative and Executive Order restrictions on their activities, particularly as regards the rights of U.S. citizens. Provides the President with periodic reports for forwarding to the Congress.

b. Conduct no inspections, but be provided copies of reports prepared by the Inspectors General of the separate intelligence organizations. Based on his review of these documents, provide the President with periodic reports for forwarding to the Congress.

c. None.

Relations with the Congress

1./ Is the chief spokesman before Congress for the Intelligence Community, including defense of the President's budget for intelligence activities and the provision of national intelligence products to the Congress in a manner worked out with the Congress and its Committees.

2./ Is the chief spokesman before Congress for the Intelligence Community on budget matters, but has no role with respect to the provision of substantive national intelligence to the Congress.

3./ Provides to the Congress only such information as the Congress may from time-to-time request; has no initiative responsibilities.

Relation to the USIB and the IRAC

a./ Serves as chairman of both the USIB and the IRAC, with these bodies continuing to have their present responsibilities. (This assumes the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer is responsible both for national intelligence products and for preparation of the NFIP.)

b./ USIB and IRAC would be abolished, and the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer charged to develop proposals for whatever advisory boards he considers are needed for his support.

c./ Serves as chairman of USIB, but has no relation to IRAC. (This assumes the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer is responsible for national intelligence production, but not for preparation of the NFIP.)

d./ Serves as chairman of IRAC, but has no relation to USIB. (This assumes the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer is responsible for the NFIP, but has no intelligence production responsibilities.)

e./ None. (USIB continues to exist as advisory to the officer responsible for the production of national intelligence. IRAC's continued existence would depend on the allocation of responsibility for preparation of the NFIP.)

me to you. And I want to start in a spirit of what I hope is comity by saying this committee has neither the jurisdiction nor the expertise to address itself to whether or not there have been violations of the SALT agreement.

This committee does, on the other hand, have specific jurisdiction over what happens to intelligence and whether or not intelligence has been withheld, not only from Congress but from certain members of the Executive Branch who, in my judgment, should have had access to intelligence.

What are we going to be able to do about getting these documents declassified? And what are we going to be able to do about getting other documents on this issue?

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM COLBY, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Mr. Colby. Mr. Chairman, I believe with respect to the specific documents which you requested the declassification of, you will have an answer by the close of business tonight or by tomorrow morning at least. You will certainly have an answer. I am discussing that with the appropriate officials as to that release.

Chairman Pike. In fairness to this committee, I just did not want the record to hang there indicating that we had refused other witnesses an opportunity to appear. We would be delighted to have other witnesses appear, but in the process of asking questions of the other witnesses, we want to be able to ask questions based on the documents which we have.

1 The Secretary of State, in his press conference the other  
2 day, just said that these particular issues, as they arose,  
3 were taken up with the Soviets. Now I have a lot of difficulty  
4 accepting the proposition that when issues have already been  
5 discussed with the Soviets, they cannot be discussed with  
6 the Americans, with a committee of Congress, for fear of  
7 revealing our sources.

8 Mr. Colby. Mr. Chairman, I believe part of the reason  
9 for handling the matter in that fashion was that there is an  
10 agreement with the Soviets that the discussions between us  
11 about these matters will remain confidential.

12 Chairman Pike. That may well be, but that has nothing to  
13 do with sources, does it?

14 Mr. Colby. It does not have to do with sources in that  
15 particular situation, but a detailed discussion of the  
16 intelligence that was picked up starts with certain indications  
17 which only come from certain sources. It then generalizes  
18 into a statement of a situation. The situation may not reveal  
19 the source, but the detailed discussion of the raw intelligence  
20 and where it started can indeed reveal the source.

21 Chairman Pike. We are not asking for a detailed discus-  
22 sion of the raw intelligence and where it started. We are  
23 asking for a discussion in open session of what happened to  
24 intelligence, and I am not going to be put off from an open  
25 session on this, and you did not suggest that.

1 I think the present period has certain similarities to  
2 the 1920s, Mr. Chairman. <sup>em</sup> ~~There~~ there was a revulsion against a  
3 war, a determination that the world had become safe for  
4 democracy, a desire to return to normalcy. This was trans-  
5 lated into extensive programs of naval disarmament, of the  
6 reduction of the American armed forces, we even took a battle-  
7 ship out and sank it to show our conviction in the naval  
8 disarmament, and one of our Secretaries of State made the  
9 somewhat famous statement as he closed up a code-breaking  
10 unit that, gentlemen, do not read each other's mail. He be-  
11 lieved he lived in a world of gentlemen.

12 As we look to the future, Mr. Chairman, I do not see  
13 that it will become a world of total detente and total  
14 gentlemen. There are problems ahead in the future world as  
15 it will be, that I believe will require intelligence. We know  
16 there is a population problem growing in the world, we know  
17 there is continued underdevelopment and that the gap between  
18 rich and poor countries is expanding rather than reducing.

19 We know of the dangers of nuclear proliferation, that  
20 small countries may be able to acquire the enormous potential  
21 of nuclear energy for warlike purposes.

22 We realize that the world economy is interdependent and  
23 that we have become dependent upon various small nations who  
24 have control over raw resources and can have an enormous  
25 impact on the economy and welfare of our people and country.

1 situations. We need intelligence in a variety of fields,  
2 we need it in the political field, we need it in the military  
3 field, we need it in the scientific field, we need it in the  
4 economic field, biographic, and even in cultural affairs  
5 because the world has become one world in that sense.

6 We must be able to anticipate future problems. I think  
7 this is the key, Mr. Chairman, to solving these future  
8 problems. Some problems can be solved if we can anticipate  
9 them because we have the time to develop the necessary  
10 weapons or policies to defend ourselves. Some problems can  
11 be solved because we have the time to develop the necessary  
12 weapons or policies to deter the problem. Some problems  
13 can be solved because we have the time and warning to be able  
14 to negotiate the problem down to a small problem instead of  
15 having it become a major confrontation and a major crisis.

16 How do we do this job of anticipating these future  
17 problems? I think intelligence does this, Mr. Chairman, by its  
18 ~~policy, its~~ programs, to raise the consciousness of our  
19 decision-makers about these problems as we look ahead so  
20 that we can become aware of these problems and the subtleties  
21 and the difficulties involved in them.

22 We are going to have to improve our ability to anticipate  
23 these problems, we are going to have to improve our ability  
24 to raise the consciousness of our decision-makers about these  
25 problems. We are going to have to bring -- we are going to

1 consciousness of the danger of war in the Middle East. We  
2 predicted that unless progress was made on the political  
3 front, that the danger of war would increase very substan-  
4 tially in the fall of 1973.

5 We also accurately predicted the outcome of a war between  
6 the Arabs and Israelis and we indicated how we thought it  
7 would come about, how it would come out, and our prediction  
8 of how it would come out proved to be accurate in the event.  
9 We did not predict the precise day on which it occurred. In  
10 fact, we were wrong in that particular prediction. But I  
11 think we certainly did do the job of intelligence of raising  
12 the consciousness of danger of attack, of danger of outbreak  
13 of war at that time even though we did not go to the last  
14 mile and predict the precise date and moment of the attack.

15 I think if you look, Mr. Chairman, at the record of  
16 the intelligence community on the latest ~~very~~ major event,  
17 you will find that the intelligence community performed  
18 exceedingly well with respect to the fall of Vietnam in this  
19 past year.

20 Last winter, about this time, we made estimates about  
21 what would happen in Vietnam over the next six months. We  
22 predicted that there would be attacks, but that they <sup>re</sup> would  
23 not be a major attack at that time; that the major attack  
24 would probably take place in 1976. But we said that if there  
25 was an opportunity, that the North Vietnamese would certainly

1 in various parts of the world. We have accurately predicted  
2 this year the low yield of the Soviet grain crop. We did  
3 not predict that it would be as low as it was before the  
4 lack of good rain brought that about, because we have not  
5 improved our prediction of weather to the degree that we have  
6 improved our prediction of other events.

7 We have followed very ~~carefully and noted the movement~~  
8 of petrodollars around the world and where they have gone to  
9 and what the political impact of this is going to be down-  
10 stream.

11 We have developed systems alerting our government to  
12 problems that are arising in the world so that our government  
13 can take stands and take steps to avoid them.

14 I think you are aware, Mr. Chairman, of the fact that  
15 we are in on the discussions of some closed societies of  
16 what their plans are; we have been ~~reading~~ <sup>reading</sup> some of the private  
17 documents of some authoritarian political parties in closed  
18 societies so that we know what their policies are and what  
19 they are thinking about.

20 We have a system of communicating these facts, these  
21 details of intelligence to our national leadership in the  
22 most rapid fashion believable. We have ~~warning~~ <sup>early</sup> warning systems that  
23 can indeed warn us of any development which seems to threaten  
24 our country in a technical way. We do not cry wolf at every  
25 event that might threaten our country because we are aware



1 to do; give us good guidelines and intelligence will follow  
2 these.

3 For example, even in my confirmation hearings some years  
4 ago, the suggestion came up that we add the word "foreign"  
5 to the word "Intelligence" whenever it appears with respect  
6 to CIA because truly we Americans want CIA to be a foreign  
7 intelligence agency, not one engaged in ~~the~~ activities here  
8 in the United States.

9 We want to avoid hypocrisy of pretending that we do not  
10 conduct intelligence while asking our professionals to do so.  
11 ~~We Americans insist that we stand up and recognize the fact~~  
12 that these are going to go on. And for that, we are willing  
13 to pay a price in terms of admission that we do conduct  
14 intelligence.

15 We are going to provide our intelligence service the  
16 necessary cover for its activities abroad, in the government,  
17 and in private industry and private life, because intelli-  
18 gence is a part of protecting the society of which they are a  
19 part.

20 We will be sure that intelligence adheres to our  
21 Constitution and to our laws in the work that it does.

22 Next, Mr. Chairman, we need supervision of intelligence.  
23 We need supervision externally, we need supervision internally.  
24 You have looked at the structures for supervision within the  
25 community and outside it. You have looked at it ~~when~~ in the

1 We are going to want intelligence to be as cheap as we  
2 can, because we do not want to waste money on intelligence.  
3 We do not want to say that our intelligence is not worth it.  
4 We are going to have to determine what expenditures are  
5 necessary on intelligence by a detailed annual review.

6 We are going to find that this world that we face and  
7 the technology and costs of people around the world make  
8 intelligence expensive. Is it worth it? How good is it?  
9 And what does it save?

10 Does it save conflict, does it save waste in other areas,  
11 does it avoid the necessity to build an antiballistic missile  
12 system at 50 or \$100 billion a year because it leads our  
13 government to negotiate a mutual agreement to abandon that  
14 particular technique?

jh fls  
rh

1 but I think we are going to have to determine that by a  
2 careful look at the budgets required, at the manpower required  
3 against the world challenges and against the costs that are  
4 inevitable. And that simple solutions such as that will not  
5 prove to be valid in the long run.

6 On the other end of the spectrum, Mr. Chairman, there  
7 are proposals to set up an intelligence czar to put one  
8 figure with enormous strength and power over all of  
9 intelligence, over Defense Intelligence, over CIA, over State  
10 Intelligence, over all intelligence.

11 Again, I think this is a questionable decision because  
12 I think that this would indeed give him perhaps more power  
13 than we in America would expect to be a good thing.

14 I think one of the kinds of intelligence we want,  
15 Mr. Chairman, is that we want some of our intelligence truly  
16 to be secret, that we want to protect our Nation's <sup>intelligence</sup> resources  
17 the way our journalists protect their sources, that we have  
18 to have some secrets that we need to keep. We have to abandon  
19 the old tradition of total secrecy, but I think we do have to  
20 agree that there are secrets in America, ~~and~~ in our ballot  
21 boxes <sup>and</sup> in other areas of our life that we do respect, and that  
22 intelligence has a legitimate area in which it needs secrets  
23 and in which its secrets need to be protected for the benefit,  
24 not of intelligence, but <sup>of</sup> our nation.

25 I think we are going to have to improve, Mr. Chairman,  
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1 covert action or influence field.

2 I think we are going to have to accept the sophistication  
3 of nations which admit that these things can take place but  
4 don't admit that they do it in direct quotations.

5 I think that this question of the exertion of secret  
6 influence in the years ahead, we are going to accept as  
7 Americans, because I think we are going to see that there is  
8 a value to that kind of action that cannot be achieved by  
9 either <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ diplomatic protest or <sup>by</sup> ~~the~~ sending the Marines.\*

10 I think we are going to have to accept the value of  
11 some quiet influence on a foreign situation so that we can  
12 defuse a problem before it arises, so that we can support  
13 democratic forces who are struggling to maintain themselves  
14 against authoritarian suppression, when this is in the  
15 interest of our country and that we are going to decide which  
16 ones are good and which ones are bad by a process of  
17 ~~consultation~~ <sup>consultation</sup> within the government and with the appropriate  
18 committees of the Congress.

19 The present Act requires that six committees be informed  
20 of any such activity. I would hope that we are going to  
21 reduce the number of committees, and that our representatives  
22 in the Congress can be representatives in the real sense as  
23 they review the propriety and advisability of any of these  
24 actions and not insist that they cannot take the responsibility  
25 of representing the other Members of the Congress and the

1 ~~I think~~ Then, Mr. Chairman, I hope that CIA can stop  
2 being a scapegoat for sensation created by its own critiques,  
3 made so that it can improve its procedures. I hope by that  
4 time, ~~that~~ when we get to 1990, we will not look back on  
5 1975 and marvel at the naivete of the Americans of 1975 as we  
6 now marvel at the naivete of the Americans of the 1920's.  
7 I believe we will have a responsible intelligence and I  
8 believe that all of us Americans will be responsible about it.

9 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

10 Chairman Pike. Thank you, Mr. Colby. No one wants more  
11 than I do to proceed immediately with questioning. I will  
12 only say that in fairness to our other witnesses and because  
13 we have four witnesses scheduled today, and a quorum call  
14 going on right now, we will continue with the presentation.

15 What is your time schedule, Mr. Colby?

16 Mr. Colby. I am at your disposal, Mr. Chairman.  
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